Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff Declassified on: 201505

MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Aug 07

766/01/69/

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFi//20170802//

Samawah: Refuge for Nasiriyah JAM

- An unknown number of JAM fighters ran from fighting in Nasiriyah to safe haven of Samawah
- Reportedly staying at farm just outside city
- Hide contains weapons including: mortars, grenades, PKCs, IEDs
- Separate group of nine JAM members fled Nasiriyah for Samawah on approximately 25 July
 - Members of Ali Kazim JAM cell, specializing in IEDs, rockets, sniping



(U) JAM fighter ducks for cover during ISF raid

Assessment: JAM fighters likely using Samawah as a refuge due to aggressive anti-JAM campaign by TSU in Nasiriyah. Likely to continue due to lack of CF presence in Samawah.

SECRET// KEL TO USA, WICE///20170802/

Annivers | Secretified to USA, MCHI/20170002// | Imam 9

- · Event Background:
- August
- Considered the Holiest Shi'a Shrine in Baghdad
- -1 million pilgrims expected at Kadhamiyah Shrine
- · Past significant activity:
 - Nov 06: 122mm rocket attack on shrine
 - Aug 05: SVEST rumors caused stampede
 - · Iragi authorities reported 965 civilian deaths
 - March 04: 3x SVEST attacks near shrine during Ashura festival
 - · 60 civilians killed
- · Potential threats to event:
 - Shrine, civilians possible targets
 - VBIED likely form of attack on crowds traveling to shrine
 - SVEST likely form of attack against crowds inside, near Shrine


Assessment: Attack possible on Kadhamiyah Shrine or celebrants. AQI has motivation, means, capability to incite sectarian violence. Security plan that incorporates curfews, limits vehicular movement could mitigate threats to this event.


SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170002//





Threat Update JAM allegedly plans armed march on Karada Peninsula 3 or 4 Aug - 350-500 marchers 15 Mar 07 About half to be armed Planned to coincide with return of Iraqi soccer team Alleged goals of march include: - Create chaos on Karada after explosion of 2 car bombs - Attack office of al-Hakim Past OMS, JAM demonstration TTPs - Notification via mosques, media - Typically 30-60 minutes - Used as JAM recruiting tool Assessment: Although there is no corroborative reporting of JAM march on Karada Peninsula, potential exists for insurgent activity surrounding return of soccer team. Any group's attempt at disruption of soccer team's victorious return would be detrimental to group's popular support.





SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:


1.4c


CIDNE Trends Data

Reuters http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224 NY Times online article










Latest Al-Qaida Video Posting On 5 Aug, web links posted on jihadist sites to video featuring Adam Gaddahn and Ayman al Zawahiri Lengthy video praises 2006 attack on US mission in Karachi to make points: - "...spy dens, and military command and control centers" continue to be AQ targets, international law notwithstanding - Suicide operations justified by early Islamic historical cases - Calls on Pakistanis for "money and souls" for jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan • Iraq cited only twice near end of video





SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

Reuters http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224 NY Times online article



Threat Update • AQI may be planning chlorine TBIED attack in western Baqubah, 9 August — Possible tanker truck x2, against CIV — Al-Katun, al-Mafraq areas • Trucks contain chlorine and unknown number of oxygen tanks • Last successful chlorine attack in Iraq was 3 June in Baqubah, FOB Warhorse • CIOC issued situational awareness report 08 1624D AUG 07 Assessment: Though AQI traditionally targets CF, ISF when employing chlorine, they might use against civilians in attempt to deter cooperation with CF. Even marginally successful attack in civilian area may yield psychological effects.

Turkey's Memorandum of Understanding With Iraq

- Memorandum of Understanding (MoU):
 - Transfer Iraqi natural gas through Turkey
 - Increase electricity transmission to Iraq
 - Discussed combating terrorism along border (KGK)




Challenges:

- Gol actions against the KGK will require Iraqi parliament approval
- If approved, agreement would be binding for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

1.4b, 1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170809//



"Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas Iraq" (IRMHI) **Publishes First Magazine** Released by Media Division of IRMHI


- Contents include:
 - Historic Statement of Hamas-Irag
 - Statement about Hamas-Iraq and JAAMI merger


 - Main Article: "The Godliness of the Mujahid"
 Production and promotion of "The Cycle of the American Soldier in Nature"
 - "Jihad in Islam: Favoring the Mujahidin"
 - "Scholars of Iraq: Shaykh Abd-al-Qadir al-Khatib"
 - "Shari'ah and Jihad: The Dividing Line Between Faith and Unbelief"
 - "The Jihadist Computer"
 - Filmed operations of the Al-Fatah al-Islami **Brigades**




Assessment: "Pioneers of Glory" is effort to expand media outreach to garner recruits and financial support, promote political views. Offers a more robust platform focused on IRMHI's message, in contrast to AQI's online attack statements and video compilations.

Sahawa ai-iray (SAI) rollitical **Aspirations** Maliki considers SAI members to fill Tawafuq ministerial seats - Maliki views SAI as legitimate representation for Sunnis, turnaround from previous suspicions about SAI's intentions Possible means to strengthen government after numerous political parties boycott Gol (U) SAI Leader Sheikh Sattar Rishaw Potential milestones to establish SAI as independent party - Run in Anbar provincial elections to establish presence - Run in Iraqi national elections, could win up to 1 COR seat and secure ministerial seat 1.4b, 1.4c 19







OMS Military Supervisory Council


Head Fired

- Fallah al-Shanati allegedly fired by Ahmad al- Shaybani
 - Purportedly fired for actions against Special Groups in al Amarah
 - Shanati attempted to remove Special Groups Commander 'Abd al-Hamid
 - Resulted in the death of 4 Special Groups members and 1 Council member
- Sadr is constantly changing leadership within the General Supervision Committee




<u>Assessment</u>: Shaybani likely feels Shanati exceeded his authority by attempting to remove al-Hamid. Replacement will likely be inexperienced handling national-level military issues. Shanati's removal leaves Military Supervision Council short on experienced commanders. Effects unlikely to be felt at JAM tactical level.

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170814/



Kidnappings at Oil Ministry



(S/MCFI) The crossing site at Safwan, IVO Navistar, is the only commercial crossing site between Kuwait and Iraq. Separating commercial and military activity at this critical junction is important militarily, economically and politically. ASR Aspen allows military equipment and most sustainment supplies to move from the port to Iraq without traversing any urban stretches of highway. Safwan is highly unstable and has a history of high criminal activity and low security presence. control. A crossing site that by-passes Safwan would avoid this threat.

(S/MCFI) The main threat groups along southern portion of MSR Tampa are Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Organization.




(S/MCFI) ASR ASPEN is a unlit, 25-26 foot wide, two-lane, soft-shoulder road. As mentioned earlier, ASR Aspen allows for 12 hour directional traffic from K-crossing to MSR Tampa. HET's, which comprise 25% of all

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- MNC-I traffic, require a minimum of 28 feet for two-way traffic.
- **(S/MCFI)** There is currently work underway to have RRP Radio Coverage throughout the entire route, but that project is currently ongoing. Inadequate SIGINT capabilities exists south of the ASR Aspen/ASR Papa intersection until the ASR Atlanta/ASR Aspen interchange.
- **(S/MCFI)** The use of GSM is significantly reduced as no towers exists along the route. Ahteer and Iraqna are currently building towers in the area but a estimated timeline for completion does not exists.
- **(S/MCFI)** EFPs are typically passive infra-red (PIR) or command wire (CW) initiated. Since July 2006, approximately 93% of all EFP's with identified initiation types along MSR Tampa from K-crossing to the intersection with Aspen were PIR initiated. PIR initiators detect a heat differential due to motion. When it detects the heat a switch closes and the detonator on the EFP is initiated. The main threat area for these types of devices is the intersection of Tampa and Aspen.
- **(S/MCFI)** The border area with Navistar continues to be a problem area with criminal activity. Hijackings remain prevalent in Safwan, a border village near Navistar.
- **(S/MCFI)** ASR Aspen is 108 kilometers long and passes through mostly empty desert, and bypasses 150 kilometers of Iraqi/Kuwaiti interstate road with much higher civilian traffic volume. It provides substantially better force protection by it's shear isolation away from any major populated areas.

Completion of the MSR Aspen Road Project will shorten the time required to transport military goods from Kuwait City north towards Baghdad. Should mitigate attacks against CF support convoys. With the TOA of Basrah province in Aug 07, insurgent and criminal elements, will exploit new security gaps in MND-SE, include probable CF interdiction along MSR Aspen.














SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170017// Sadrist CoR Reps Attempting to Unify After Public Statements All Sadrists CoR members scheduled to meet in Najaf on 24 Aug Sadrists reveal internal conflict in press statements on 11 Aug Ahmed Sharifi announced himself as the new leader of the Sadrists' Political Council, saying Sadr declared boycott of political process (b)(6)Senior Sadrists immediately counter Sharifi's statement "We will continue our role to correct the government action" Stated "al-Sharifi does not represent any Sadrist authority" Child in Sadr City with Some CoR discussed a possible lawsuit portrait of al-Sadr against Sharifi <u>Assessment</u>: Though it is unlikely Sharifi has backing of many Sadrists, rift may be developing between some Sadrist CoR members over lack of participation in Gol. Due to apparently unauthorized declaration, unlikely Sharifi will be retained. 30




















SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF1//20170022// Threat Update JAM allegedly plans to assassinate Dhi Qar Province Governor Aziz Ogheli - Event to occur within 3-4 days Method of attack identified as IED Third Governor targeted within 10 days: 12 Aug, Qadisiyah Gov Jalil Khalil Hamzah assassinated; method IED 19 Aug, Muthanna Gov Mohammad Ali Hassan's assassinated; method IED Governors targeted because of their support to CF and their firm stance against JAM activities Gov Ogheli enlisted aid of influential Nasiriyah Gov Aziz Ogheli Sheik to try to stop JAM attacks on local authorities CIOC issued situational awareness report 15 1512D AUG 07 Assessment: JAM attempting to expand influence by intimidation of ISCI members. Other ISCI-affiliated political figures could be targeted as well. 39

AQI Mosur Network Attempting to


- Reconstitute
 Mosul AQI network restructured in the wake of significant leadership losses in recent months
 - Restructure result of CF successes against AQI; infighting made leadership in Mosul inefficient
 - Mosul divided into four sections, North, South, East, West
 - Each section assigned military commander
- AQI building VBIEDs in Mosul to use in attacks in Mosul and elsewhere
 - Production and distribution rising. increased attacks, discoveries
- Reported V/TBIED threats in Mosul
 - TBIED threat, 22 August at IP HQ
 - Multiple-VBIED threat streams



VBIED in Mosul

Assessment: Restructuring, reorganization have enhanced group's effectiveness. Network likely to increase VBIED production, endeavoring to reinforce relevance. Increased VBIED facilitation activity supports completed reorganization.

40







JAM Using Fuel to Generate Revenue


- · JAM controlling fuel distribution in parts of Baghdad
 - Fueling stations controlled directly or through intimidation
 - Award fueling privileges to JAM members, supporters
- · JAM selling stolen fuel on the black market
 - Inflate prices to fund JAM operations
- · OMS creates fuel revenue monitoring office
 - Supervises revenues obtained, directs funds to finance weapons purchases



Black Market Vendor

Assessment: JAM attempting to portray themselves as provider of services to Shi'a; make Gol appear incompetent. Possibly use gas stations to control local populace, provide incentive for JAM support/membership. These tactics could bring resentment of JAM as opposed to support.

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)



• Hamas-Iraq

-Jihadist Websites- OSC Summary in Arabic, 20070820, Islamic Resistance Movement

Jihad and Reformation Front

-Associated Press Worldstream, 20070813, As reported by Maamoun Youessef, Cairo, Egypt

• 1920 Revolution Brigades

-Jihadist Websites- OSC Summary in Arabic, 20070718, Hamas Iraq Interview

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170625//

IAEA and Iran – Agree to Agree...Again

- (U) IAEA Dep Dir and Iranian Dep Nuclear Negotiator meet in Tehran, 21 August for 3rd and final round of talks
 - Agree to establish a "final" timetable to clear up outstanding questions
 - Details reported at IAEA meeting next month in Vienna
- · (U) Reactions to agreement mixed
 - US says agreement is insufficient, does not bring Iran in line with UN demands
 - Khamenei says no power can deter their nuclear technology program
- (U) Iran says future inspections will include uranium enrichment and heavy water facilities






(C//REL) Assessment: IAEA and Iran eager to sell timetable as means to forestall potential next round of UNSC sanctions. Despite recent IAEA excursions to some Iranian nuclear facilities, enrichment unabated, "freeze for freeze" not feasible.

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170825//

45

All Sources are Open Source



- Jaysh al Haqq (JAH) is a small Sunni Resistance group from the Anbar area
 - Recent falling out with AQ; Claimed success against AQI in Abu Ghurayb and Amiriyah

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

- Al Arabiyah Program on Iraqi Tribal War w/ AQ, 20070615
- London al Hayah (Internet Version) in Arabic, 20070719
- JAH leader initiated a meeting with PM Maliki likely held in late-June
 - DIRNSA 071536ZJUL07
 - London al Hayah (Internet Version) in Arabic, 20070702
 - London al Hayah (Internet Version) in Arabic, 20070805
- Abu Ali began forming National Salvation Front in al Anbar
 DIRNSA 081717ZAUG07

Illegal Refineries rueing onderground


- Illegal refineries provide outlet, create market for stolen crude in north
 - Incentive for breaching crude pipelines
 - Distill a low octane motor fuel
 - Rudimentary technology, construction facilitates replication, mobility
 - Not always profitable, however
- Illegal micro-refineries common in Chechnya and Turkey
 - Those in N. Iraq based on Turkish components
- Minimal footprint
 - Small heat signature, sooty exhaust, distinctive odor



Assessment: Frequency of crude oil pipeline interdictions in the north suggests many illegal, private refineries driven by shortages of domestic oil products, profit potential. Automotive fuel most likely product; diesel or kerosene less profitable. Legalization has potential to supply local markets, stimulate employment and encourage innovation.

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


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
Page 51 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d


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
- F/C reaches record high
 - CIDNE Data
 - VBIED production up, but volume of detonations unchanged
 - CIDNE Data
- Recent leadership changes yet to translate into increased effective attacks
 - Multiple TD, IIR, and SIGINT reports that reflect AQI leadership changes in Mosul
 - Increased public reporting indicator of rejection of AQI in Mosul
 - Multiple TD, IIR, and THT reports that reflect increased public cooperation with ISF and CF in Mosul
- Mosul ISF demonstrating increasing effectiveness
 - CIDNE Data
 - Responsible for 83% of F/C this month
 - CIDNE Data



- Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Nationwide
 - Trends Data Aug 07



- Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Districts
 - Trends Data Aug 07



• 27-28 Aug, JAM battle with ISF in Karbala during the Anniversary of the Birth of Mohammad al-Mahdi

1.40

AP, 20070828, A Million Pilgrims Told to Leave Kerbala Al-Arabia-Dubai (in Arabic), 20070828, Iraq: 25 Killed, 65 Wounded in Kerbala Clashes

ISF have taken security measures to ensure public safety

CNN.com, 20070828, Curfew, Gun Ban Imposed After Fighting Reuters, 20070828, Pilgrims Flee Iraq City as Gun Battles Rage


• Sadr reportedly called for calm in Karbala

Reuters, 20070828, Irag's Sadr Calls for Calm in Kerbala

Turkey: New President, New


• (U) President Abdullah Gul Challenges

- - Elected in third round of voting
 - Pledged to represent all Turkey, not just AKP supporters
 - Pro-active in terms of secularist concerns
- (U) Challenges Ahead
 - Possible legal issues- Welfare Party 1998
 - Republican People's Party, CHP stance- boycott of functions, political maneuvering
 - Tensions with Turkish General Staff, TGS, regarding proposed changes to constitution





- •(U) President Abdullah Gul
 - See Sources below
- (U) Challenges Ahead
 - See sources below
- All bullets derived from Open Source
 - AP, 20070828, Gul Wins Turkey's Presidency
 - The Financial Times Limited, 20070828, Turkey Elects Gul President
 - TelegraphRSS, 20070828, Warning by Military on Eve of Turkey Elections
 - Turkish Daily News, 20070815, Gul's Reassurances of Upholding Secular Constitution
 - Turkish Daily News, 20070816, CHP to Boycott Cankaya



- Sadr allegedly orders JAM to cease all activities, no exceptions
 - AP, 20070829, Cleric Freezes Activities of his Militia
 - TD-314/60801-07, C2, B2 Sadr Orders Stand-down
 - 17225-07, 212121ZAUG 07, Sadrists Condemn Killings in Diwaniya
 - 17693-07 291939ZAUG 07, Sadrist Official Unhappy About Decision, But Accepts It
 - BBC News, 070828, Sadr 'Freezes' Militia Activities
 - AFP, Iraq's Sadr Orders Halt to Attacks on US-Led Troops
- Prior to this announcement, Sadr called for calm during conflict between ISF and JAM in Karbala
 - Reuters, 070828, Iraq's Sadr Calls for Calm in Karbala

| SECRET//REL TO USA, MSF1//20170830 For display only to IRQ | |
|--|------|
| 1920 Revolution Brigades Efforts to Exploit AQI | |
| • 1920 Revolution Brigades (1920RB) using disinformation campaign to reinforce image of AQI { 1.4b, 1.4d | |
| Spreading warning of impending AQI chemical, biological attack on Mahmudiyah | |
| - Plan to disseminate pamphlets tying attack to AQI, supply of agents from 1.4b & Afghanistan | |
| - 'Mortar rounds contain cholera & unnamed chemical weapons' | |
| Likely tied into Southern Sector initiative to unite Sunni & Shi'a | 0 |
| Select 1920RB members have relationship with AQI in south, however 1920RB clearly exploiting AQI network | |
| Biological threat recognized as unlikely by 1920RB Southern Sector leaders doubts not reiterated to lower-level members | but |
| Recent example - Sa'ad al-Shammari procuring weapons through AQI for 19. | 20RB |
| Assessment: 1920RB has increasingly clear agenda to undermine, exploit AQI south of Baghdad. Increasing intra-Shi'a violence grants opportunity for Sunnis to aggressively their position. Exploitation of AQI likely to be growing trend nationwide, complicating truth' for CF, ISF operators. | |
| SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170850 | 57 |

• 1920 Revolution Brigade (1920 Rev Bde) using dis-information campaign to reinforce image of AQI & Iran as enemies of Iraqi people

1.4c 1920 Rev Bde and AQI Plan Propoganda Campaign Threatening BIO in Mahmudiyah

 Select 1920RB members have relationship with AQI in south, however 1920RB clearly exploiting AQI network


1920 Rev Bde Members Concerned About Recent


1920 Rev Bde Official to Purchase Mortar

1920 Rev Bde Members Inventory Rockets,

Mortars, RPGs

SECRET//REL TO USA, WICE///20170031// JAM Reaction to Sadr's Freeze Order Baghdad units informed of order by late-day 30 August Members not permitted to hold meetings, conduct any activities, or consider selves part of JAM Violators possibly subject to punishment from Gol Contradictory orders from Shaybani Fear that Sadr planned to permanently dissolve organization JAM elements unhappy with order but complying Abu Karrar believed Special Groups not included in Sadr's order 30 August, Shaybani denied making statement that freeze included attacks against CF Ahmad Shayban Assessment: JAM-SG will probably continue activities believing Sadr's order does not apply to them. Backtracking statements likely in response to positive reaction from CF, concern over elements continuing attacks. Order may erode morale, encourage rogue activity. SECRET/KEL TO USA, MICHI//20170031// All Levels of JAM Learn of al-Sadr's Order to Cease All





Security worsens as Mol security forces take responsibility from MoD for protecting MoH

 MoH FPS that have undergone MoI sponsored training are returning to duty

• (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) Corruption and Sectarian Activity Continues at Medical City in Baghdad (A2)